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## II.—THE DOG IN THE RIG-VEDA.

In one of his ingenious if extravagant articles, Brunnhofer, writing to prove that the Rig-Veda was composed before the Aryans entered India, lays stress on the fact that the family-name of one of the Vedic seers means 'dog'; whence, as our author concludes, the poet must have been a 'dog-revering Iranian.'<sup>1</sup>

This statement surely implies that there is something unusual in finding 'dog' as a man's name in the Rig-Veda, and shows that the author thinks the dog to have been despised in the Vedic period. But, in point of fact, in the Rig-Veda we find 'Dog's Tail' as a proper name, and in the Brahmanic period we learn that a good Brahman gave this canine name in three different forms to his three sons, so that Çunaḥpuccha, Çunaḥçepa and Çunolāṅgūla (Ait. Br. vii. 15) all rise as witnesses against Brunnhofer; while later still, withal in the most Brahmanic period, we find Dog's Ear, Çunaskarṇa, handed down as a respectable name. Āçvalāyana's teacher was a Çaunaka. Even were the animal despised, the name, then, was unobjectionable; as actually happens in the parallel case of the jackal, which is found as a proper name, although the beast was contemptible. Brunnhofer, to be sure, relegates all jackal-names, for the same reason, to the Turanians; but this is rather absurd, in view of the fact that as late as the grammatical period we have a scholar called Jackal-son. Like Çunaka, Çāunaka, we find Kroṣṭuka, Krāuṣṭuki, both the name and the patronymic (*kroṣṭar*, common and proper name), and both good Hindu names.

But it is to the implication that the dog was a despicable beast in the eyes of the Vedic Aryans that the strongest exception may

<sup>1</sup> Iran und Turan, p. 152: "Als Sohn eines vom Hunde benannten Mannes (Çunaka) kann der Stammvater des Verfassers des II. Maṇḍala nur als Iranier aufgefasst werden, weil . . . der Hund bei den brahmanischen Sanskrit-Ariern ein verachtetes Thier war, nach welchem sich Niemand benannt haben würde." Compare also ib., p. 165: "Çunaka . . . ein Name, der schlechterdings, bei der grossen Verachtung des Hundes unter den Brahmanen, nur ein hundeverehrender Iranier tragen konnte."

be taken; for the contrary point is proved by appeal to the Rig-Veda itself. Schrader (*Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, p. 383) says scarcely anything in regard to the position of the dog among the Vedic people. On investigating the matter we learn that in the Rig-Veda the dog is the companion and ally of man; the protector and probably the inmate of his house; a friend so near that he pokes his too familiar head into the dish, and has to be struck aside as a selfish creature. He may have been employed as a steed—the chariot of the Maruts is pictured as one drawn by dogs; but he is, at any rate, used for hunting, and the gift of a kennel of one hundred dogs is gratefully acknowledged. He is never spoken of with scorn, and is deprecated only when he barks or offends by too great eagerness—and then the prayer against him implies familiarity rather than contempt. Once a poet complains that in his need he was forced to eat dog's flesh (entrails), but it may have been sorrow for the dog that prompts his plaint; or, if Brunnhofer would argue that the poet thereby shows contempt, it may be replied that it is cooked dog's entrails to which the poet objects, not the live dog. The dogs of Yama are for him protectors. Saramā is the *devaṣunī*, the gods' dog, and Rudra goes accompanied with dogs (AV.). Whatever the mysterious verse means which declares that 'the goat addressed the dog as (the Ṛbhus') awakener,' it is evident that it contains no malignant hit at the canine race. Here is a lullaby from the Rig-Veda which shows on how familiar a footing stood the dog:

Sleep the mother, sleep the father,  
Sleep the dog and sleep the master,  
Sleep may all the blood-relations,  
Sleep the people round about!<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> As ally of man compare RV. ii. 39. 4: "like two dogs guard our bodies" (Yama's dogs in x. 14. 10-11). In ix. 101. 1, 13 the long-tongued selfish dog is driven from the dish. The hunting dog is called 'boar-desiring' (*varāhayās*, x. 86. 4; compare *ṣvāvarāhikā*). For the dog as motive-power compare *ṣineṣita* in viii. 46. 28 (doubtful) with *ṣvāṣva*. Barking dogs may reasonably be objected to as inimical (i. 182. 4), without contempt. As a gift compare Vāl. 7. 3; as a proper name, i. 24. 12, 13; v. 2. 7. The lullaby or charm is found in RV. vii. 55. 5; AV. iv. 5. 6; the allusion to eating dog, in iv. 18. 13; the capric passage, i. 161. 13. As an evil spirit, along with other howlers of the forest, owl-ghosts and dog-ghosts are known (*ṣvadyātu*, vii. 104. 20, 22). In AV. compare also vi. 37. 3; xi. 2. 2; iv. 36. 6; xi. 2. 30. In Chānd. Up. i. 12 dogs sing a hymn!

It is surely an old legend that is worked up into the spiritual trial of the great king in the epic. After a glorious reign the monarch mounts to heaven with his brothers, his wife and a dog. The way is long, and one by one his human companions fall, but the dog, faithful to the end, accompanies the king to the entrance of heaven. The god appears: "Enter, O king." "But not without this faithful dog," replies the king. The god: "Desert the dog; there is no lack of mercy in doing so." The king: "*Noblesse oblige*,<sup>1</sup> I will either not share in your heavenly world or share it with this faithful attendant." The god: "There is no place in heaven for men with dogs." The king: "To desert a faithful friend is as great a sin as to slay a priest." Here we have the later idea of the ceremonial impurity attaching to the dog united with the epic freedom of regarding the dog as a friend; but perhaps this episode of the dog was imported from Iran!

The horse-sacrifice is ejected from India by Brunnhofer in the same summary way as, on the grounds explained above, he throws out the second book of the Rig-Veda. In the volume already referred to (p. 160) the author declares that the horse-sacrifice can have arisen only "in a land rich in horses," and hence, if we desire to find the country where the horse-sacrifice began and was developed "werden wir nirgends anders als nach Iran hinblicken dürfen." It is here assumed that India in the Vedic period was not rich in horses, and Brunnhofer adds that in consequence of the hot, damp climate, India was never distinguished for its steeds. The latter remark may be correct (although the Rig-Veda itself speaks of the Indus as *svāṣṭvā surāthā* 'having excellent horses and chariots,' x. 75. 8), but the statement that the Vedic horse-sacrifice requires a land where horses are numerous is not necessarily true, and the deduction that India was not rich in horses depends on the *a priori* assumption that India was not the land of the Vedic poets. For the Vedic poets extol the horse-sacrifice, and horses and horse-races are sprinkled over every page of the Rig-Veda. With what right, then, can it be assumed that the poets and their horses were not in India? Do not the epic heroes also have horse-races? The notion that India is not a land rich in horses emanates from Roth, who should have been cited in connection with this statement. Compare Z. D. M. G. XXXV, p. 686:

<sup>1</sup>*Anāryam āryeṇa śakyaṁ kartuṁ duṣkaram etad ārya*, xvii. 3. 9.

“Diese Sitte [horse-racing] kann in beschränkteren Thalebenen sich erhalten wenn sie eingebürgert ist, aber entsprungen ist sie wohl nur in angrenzenden weiten Flächen . . . Anderseits ist jedoch zu merken dass . . . das Ross [in the Rig-Veda] ein selteneres und werthvolles Thier ist, das nicht wie das Rind, zu Hunderten und Tausenden besessen und verschenkt wird, sondern in einzelnen Paaren oder wenigstens in mässiger Zahl.”

On the contrary, in the Rig-Veda the horse is not rare (although he is valuable); he is, exactly like kine, owned and given by hundreds and by thousands. In Rig-Veda v. 33. 8 a gift of ten horses is recorded; in ib. vi. 47. 22–24, one of ten horses and ten chariots. Purupanthās gave one poet, according to his own acknowledgment, “hundreds, thousands of horses” (vi. 63. 10), and in the eighth book (Persian?) gifts of three hundred and of sixty thousand horses respectively are received (viii. 6. 47; 46. 22). In the passage cited above (Väl. 7. 3), where is acknowledged the gift of one hundred dogs, the recipient acknowledges also the gift of four hundred mares. These passages may be late additions to old hymns—although Brunnhofer, who erects so much on a *dānastuti* basis, would probably not claim this—but they are, at any rate, as authentic as are the statements in regard to gifts of cattle, and unless hundreds or thousands be a ‘mässige Zahl,’ it will be necessary to take quite a different view on this subject than that of Roth. Wherever horse-raising began, there is no evidence whatever that India was not from the earliest times devoted to the horse or lacked a supply, even if it was not customary to have so large a herd of horses as of cattle. Certainly there is in the Rig-Veda no ground for this argument advanced by Brunnhofer in regard to the literature on the horse-sacrifice.

Brunnhofer’s hobby, to the elucidation of which he has now devoted three volumes, is the idea that the Rig-Veda was written on the south or east side of the Caspian Sea, and not in India. To support this hypothesis he has brought forward a number of interesting geographical facts and some Vedic names which, as he thinks, show Turanian or Iranian origin. But besides this argument of names—many of which are of doubtful connection with the foreign names adduced as related, while some are probably no more indicative of geographical situation than are European names in America—there occurs in our author’s writings every now and then an argument that is of more conse-

quence. It has been shown how, in the little matter of dogs and horses, there is not found the accuracy which would be desirable, considering how important is the use made of the asserted facts. Still more deplorable is it to find employed an argument which may be put symbolically thus: 'Since  $\chi$  is Iranian, it cannot be Indian; hence, being found in the Veda, the Veda is Iranian; and if Iranian, it must have arisen near the Caspian Sea'—and then to discover that, after all,  $\chi$  is Indian. For example, the contemplative theosophy shown in the Varuna hymns is said to be not natural to India: it must be Iranian; and then follows: "Wenn wir uns aber im gesammten Iran nach einer Landschaft umsehen wo die tropische Ueberfülle der gütigen Natur ein solches Hinbrüten über die den Augen und Ohren sich aufdrängenden Räthsel des Daseins ermöglichte, so bleibt uns keine andere Wahl als dieselbe am Südrande des Kaspischen Meeres zu suchen" (ib., p. 176). What nonsense! To maintain that a people so essentially theosophic and philosophic as the Indian could not have thought out a god like Varuna is the emptiest assumption, and on that assumption hangs the whole argument.

This from the first volume, *Iran und Turan*.

In Brunnhofer's second volume, *Vom Pontus bis zum Indus* (1890), there is an interesting argument which, illustrating at once the learned author's method and the verisimilitude of his important discoveries, deserves to be cited almost entire<sup>1</sup>: "Through all the Rig-Veda there constantly recurs the prayer which, e. g., is thus formulated by the Ṛshi Ḡṛtsamada, ii. 33. 2: 'I would reach one hundred winters by means of thy best medicines,' or by Vasiṣṭha, vii. 101. 6: 'May my sacrifice preserve (me) to the age of one hundred autumns.' Even in the Vājasa-neyi-Saṁhitā, xiii. 41, and in Aitareya-Brahmaṇa, vi. 2, one hundred years are named as the highest age of life (v. Weber, *Ind. St.* I 313, note). The reckoning of time according to hundred winters or autumns can have arisen only in a rough mountain-district of Iran; and, too, the age of one hundred years that at first seems fantastic (in which, however, there was once doubtless some truth) can be explained only from the conserving power of the pure mountain air of a highland country." Then Armenia is shown to be a place where the age of one hundred years can be reached, and the reader is left to draw the

<sup>1</sup> With the omission of the Sanskrit text (*loc. cit.*, p. 97).

inevitable conclusion that the whole of the Rig-Veda, which contains such prayers as those cited above, could have been composed only in Iran.

In regard to which is to be noted—First, that the use of ‘autumn’ may be a form handed down from a time centuries before the literature, in which is found the formula, was composed, even as the formula is still preserved centuries after the Rig-Veda collection was completed; for the regular epic benediction is *jīva śaradaḥ śatam* ‘live one hundred autumns.’ Again, the Vedic type for a year is less winter than autumn, while in the Rig-Veda summer also occurs as the equivalent of year. Compare vii. 66. 11: “who established the autumn,<sup>1</sup> the month and the day”; and the use of summer in iv. 57. 7; x. 85. 5; 124. 4; also the stock phrase *śatā-śārādāya*. No word for old meaning ‘possessed of winters’ occurs in a form parallel to *śarādvān* ‘possessed of autumns.’ Moreover, autumn is naturally the type of the year, and winter scarcely less so, even in India, for these are the only seasons when life is worth living; spring is debilitating and summer is unendurable.

Secondly, in regard to the use of one hundred, if wishes implied facts India is just where it is allowable to predicate one hundred years as a probable age for man to live, for in the Rig-Veda no more than in later times this length of time, or more, is the wish expressed. In Mandelslo we read that the proper formula is “may one live seven hundred years,” and as this is A. D. 1638, it will scarcely be thought even by Brunnhofer that the wisher lived in Armenia’s mountains. In the same work it is stated that the Hindus regard one hundred years as the limit of mortal life. To revert to the Upanishads, we have in the Chāndogya the historical statement that Mahidāsa lived 116 years.<sup>2</sup> Compare Ait. Ār. ii. 2. 1. 1, where it is assumed that one hundred years is the limit. Historical examples are not lacking to show that in our own time men have reached that age in India (and America) without resorting to mountain-tops. Finally, one hundred in the Rig-Veda generally means not 100, but ‘many’; compare *śatā-kratu*, *śatāmūti*, *śatāvāja*; although *daśamī*, the tenth of ten-

<sup>1</sup> Harvest. Compare for one hundred years as norm in the earlier period Çat. Br. v. 4. 1. 13, etc.; but no more so here than later, Manu, i. 83, and Kauṣīt. Upan. ii. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Chānd. Up. iii. 16. 7: (Mahidāsa Aitareya) *sa ha śoḍaśam varṣaśatam ajīvat*.

year periods, shows that hundred may here be taken literally. But in most cases it is a mere wish that is uttered.

Therefore, whether we take one hundred as a fact or, as it should be taken, as a wish, the argument based on the number is worthless. It is not necessary to go to Iran to find the place where "may we live one hundred winters (or autumns)" must have first been formulated. All that is true in Brunnhofer's contention is, that a consistent use of winter as the type of year would point to a northern abode. But we see that in the Rig-Veda 'autumn' is also employed for year, and that this formula lasts for centuries. Hence it may have been used for centuries before the literature began; and so, too, may 'winter' have been used in just such an expression, and that formula may have been stereotyped and preserved for generations. Analogy would show this to have been the case.

But Brunnhofer has given us even a better bit of philologic logic. In his last volume, *Vom Aral bis zur Gangā* (1892), he endeavors to prove that the king mentioned in the following verse was a Parthian monarch who lived in the plains about Merw: "These [previously recounted] are the gifts of *Prthuçravas Kānīta*, the one who gives richly. He has given a golden car; he was a generous prince; he has got the widest glory." 'Widest glory' is a play on *Prthuçravas*, i. e. 'he of broad fame,' an appellation exactly like that in *prthuyāman* 'she of broad paths' (Dawn), and other Vedic adjectives. But Brunnhofer's argument is as follows (p. 145): Instead of meaning 'he of broad fame,' *Prthuçravas* *might be* 'the fame of the Parthians.' This king called Fame-of-the-Parthians lived near the Caspian Sea; for the conditions under which the hymn is written require a great plain, and there is such a plain about Merw. The necessity for this plain is apparent, because an extended system of canals under a Parthian king requires a great plain. The system of canals is implied by the sobriquet *Kānīta*. This name is a patronymic from *kanīta*, usually interpreted as 'son of a maiden,' but this is impossible (compare *παρθένιος*, *παρθενίας*, *Παρθενοναῖος*?), for instead of being Sanskrit (Vedic), it might be a foreign Iranian word, and then its Vedic form would be, if we assume a change of ending, *khanītar* for *kanīta*; and if we explain *khanītar* from *khan* 'to dig,' as meaning a 'digger of canals,' we have the proof desired!

That is to say, assuming that *Prthuçravas* does not mean what



it apparently does; and assuming that *kanīta* must be Iranian, and that if Iranian it stands for *khanītar*; and that, if it is *khanītar* = 'digger,' this 'digger' must be a canal-digger; then the assumption that this assumed 'digger of canals' is a Parthian necessitates us to believe that the assumed king called 'Fame of the Parthians' lived near the Oxus, because there is a plain there where an 'extended system of canals' is practicable!

It is scarcely necessary to point out in addition that another assumption is not proved, viz. that this tag to an earlier hymn<sup>1</sup> is itself early; or that the sole proof offered that 'digger' must be canal-digger—viz. because *khanītrima* '(water) in a ditch' might be by another assumption rendered 'canal-water'—is not sufficient evidence. In a word, there is as much presumption as assumption in the whole proof.

What is the implied principle that underlies so much of Brunnhofer's speculation? It is that similarity, when found between the customs or ideas of two peoples, signifies that these customs or ideas could not have been produced independently. We have seen this especially prominent in his interpretation of loftier Hindu religious thought, which is relegated to the Persians, or their ancestors, because it corresponds with an Iranian mood of mind.

But turning from Brunnhofer's works, let us now examine the general theory of probabilities on which rest so many comparable arguments for primitive association in law, custom and religion. Does it follow that because there is likeness in any regard between the laws, customs and religious beliefs of two members of the Aryan group, that therefore these laws, customs or religious beliefs must be referred to a common origin, or that one of the groups must have borrowed from the other?

As 'Indo-European' are cited, in view of what we know from India, Greece and Germany (Tacitus), the virtue of hospitality, the vice of desperate gaming, and other international traits. The common naming of stars (Ursa Major) as 'Bear' has also been emphasized. In Williams' Key, cited in Palfrey's History of New England, vol. I, p. 36, note, we read that the North American Indians whose habitat was Massachusetts gave the Ursa Major "their own name for the bear." And in the same work, p. 32, speaking of the traits of these Indians as recorded by

<sup>1</sup>RV. viii. 46. 24.

those that first knew them, the author notes as peculiarly characteristic of the Indian that "he was a desperate gambler"; while on p. 37 his great virtue is recorded as being "hospitality."<sup>1</sup>

In Tacitus' *Germania*, concerning the chiefs and captains there is a passage which, when compared with what is said of other Aryans, should also be set beside this note in regard to the American Indians: "The sachem was not necessarily the captain. Command fell to him who was recognized as the most capable and experienced warrior" (ib., p. 39). Compare *reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt*, etc. (7).

In religion, even in the minutiae of religious hocuspocus, there is no certainty that agreement betokens inheritance. In the *Rig-Veda* seven is a mystic number, and its sanctity is trebled by the use of  $3 \times 7$ . But not only seven, even this mystic  $3 \times 7$  is a current religious number among the Mexicans.<sup>2</sup>

Worthless are many comparisons of like gods, and for the same reason. In this regard sins Ehni, who, on p. 196 of *Der vedische Mythos des Yama*, begins a "Comparison of the Indian (Hindu) Yama-myth with analogous sagas of Hellenic mythology" with the words "*Der hellenische Volksstamm . . . hat das ur-arische Erbgut . . . treu bewahrt*," and continuing, says: "*Die Identität des Namens [Yamas] . . . ist nur in einer mehr oder weniger genauen Uebersetzung (Dionysos, Rhadamanthys) bewahrt worden, oder auch ganz verloren gegangen, aber die eigenthümlichen Ideen . . . finden wir bei den Hellenen.*" Thence the author goes on to find the Yama-myth in various Grecian forms, on the slender basis of similar ideas and their development in India and Hellas. Then turning to the eternal Tacitus, he finds in *Tuisco-Mannus* the exact parallel to Yama-Manu; while the cosmogony of the *Edda* helps him to refer the birds of Ymir (= Yama) from the bright and dark heavens (of the Hindu) (= *Muspelheim* and *Niflheim*) to the remotest period of Indo-

<sup>1</sup> That this criticism is not directed against a man of straw may be seen by comparing p. 5 of Holtzmann's essay *Ueber das alte indische Epos*: "*Das Mahabharata (ist) oft der beste Commentar zur Germania.*" As examples to illustrate Tacitus are given from the Hindu epic 'desperate gambling, faithfulness of followers, blood-revenge, paradise as a reward for dying on the field of battle'; and these similarities between German and Hindu "permit us to assume a great antiquity for the germ of the Hindu epic." Every one of these traits belongs to the American Indians!

<sup>2</sup> The writer owes this last statement to verbal information given to him by Dr. Brinton.

European unity; nor does he hesitate, advancing consistently on the same lines, to identify the origin of man from parts of Ymir with that theologic parable which is set down in one of the latest hymns of the Rig-Veda, where men are produced from members of the Universal Person.

The moral to be drawn from this is applicable above all in the case of comparative law. Without taking this into consideration, Leist<sup>1</sup> has ventured upon a comparison of Graeco-Italian laws with those of India, claiming, because of similarity, a mutual origin for many practices, some of which have been picked out of law-books in India which are of so recent a date that their statutes should not be compared with any alien laws. And as a result he has erected quite a code, comprising what he calls by a misnomer *jus gentium*, of which it is safe to say not a quarter is primitive law.<sup>2</sup>

No law, custom, or religious belief of one country can, merely because it is like that of another country, therefore be assumed to be borrowed, or to have come from the same source. This is a principle which should be emphasized until it be followed in all comparative investigation on the Aryan group.

EDWARD WASHBURN HOPKINS.

<sup>1</sup> Alt-arisches Jus Gentium, and Graeco-italische Rechtsgeschichte.

<sup>2</sup> On p. 605 of the *Jus Gentium*, Leist speaks of the "institutions, customs, formulae and thoughts (of India), which coincide so remarkably with Greek and Roman sources and often are so marked by the same Aryan words that I hold as certain the Indo-Graeco-Italian connection." The correspondence of words is not so frequent, and when it fails, that of ideas is not enough to prove the point.